Most theoretical studies of corruption develop micro models of individual acts while empirical papers study corruption at the country level. We build an agent-based model to provide the missing link between these two groups. Here the societal corruption level is derived from individual corruption levels optimally chosen by agents with varying risk aversion and human capital. It, in turn, affects the risk-return profile of corruption for the individual agents. Simulating a multi-generational economy with heterogeneous agents we show that there are locally stable equilibrium corruption levels with certain socioeconomic determinants. However there are situations when corruption can rise till it stifles all economic activity.
Introduction
The issue of corruption has been receiving increasing attention from economists in recent years. Tanzi (1998) and Bardhan (1997) provide fairly comprehensive surveys of the recent research in the area. However, while most theoretical studies of corruption tend to focus on the micro models of the phenomenon studying individual acts of corruption, the empirical papers typically study corruption at the country level. A macro model of the phenomenon, linking the national level of corruption to the incentives of individual agents is yet to emerge. In the absence of such a model, the determinants of economy-wide corruption level and the possible remedies of corruption remain unclear.
A general equilibrium model of corruption is crucial for understanding the phenomenon at a macro level as well as for designing policy.
Understanding the dynamics of corruption level in a country is as important as explaining the variation of corruption across countries. Casual empiricism in third world countries suggests that corruption is not only widespread but seems to be ever increasing.
The media is more replete with corruption stories now than a couple of decades ago. Is this the result of simply greater transparency or is corruption indeed becoming more rampant with time? Can corruption keep rising indefinitely? It is relevant to note here that corruption is hardly a modern phenomenon. The Indian political philosopher Kautilya talks about corruption as far back as in the fourth century B.C. It seems unlikely that corruption has been rising continuously for over the last two millennia. Then are there economy-wide forces that determine the "equilibrium" level of corruption in a country? Is this equilibrium a steady state or does it have cycles? What parameters determine its levels? How does the level of development affect it? Why is corruption more widespread in the developing countries than in the industrial nations? The aim of this paper is to develop a dynamic general equilibrium model of corruption that will help us answer these questions.
The central insight of this paper is that corruption at the societal level is the outcome of individual choice of corruption levels -and that choice is rooted in the riskreturn trade-off faced by an individual, very similar to a portfolio selection problem. The risk and return of corrupt activity to the individual agents, in turn, depend, among other things, on the overall corruption level. The more widespread corruption is, the lower is its risk and rewards. A general equilibrium model using this idea is developed and its outcomes explored using simulations. The temporal behavior of the corruption level and the comparative statics of the model are then examined. 
Literature Review
Theoretical research on corruption dates back at least to the 1970s with Krueger (1974) and Rose-Ackerman (1975) , among others, making pioneering contributions to understanding the phenomenon of corruption and rent-seeking behavior. In recent years Cadot (1987) has modeled corruption as a gamble for civil servants at every level and finds, among other things that the probability of punishment diminishes with the general level of corruption, Basu et al (1992) have demonstrated how an individual's choice of corruption level differs when he considers the possibility of corruption in the rest of society as compared to that when the choice is made in isolation. Shleifer and Vishny 4 (1993) have shown that the structure of government institutions and of the political process affect corruption levels and the illegality and secrecy associated with corruption exacerbate its distortionary effects. Besley and McLaren (1993) Rijckeghem and Weder (1997) find negative correlation between civil service wage level and the level of corruption. Leite and Weidmann (1999) find support for their hypothesis that natural resource abundance promotes rent-seeking behavior or corruption.
The effects of corruption have received no less attention. Mauro (1995) and Campos et al (1999) find that corruption adversely affects growth by discouraging investment. Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) find that corruption reduces growth by distorting public investment. Gupta et al (1998) find that corruption reduces economic growth, makes the tax system less progressive, reduces the level and effectiveness of social spending and human capital formation, perpetuates an unequal distribution of asset ownership and unequal access to education, and consequently raises income inequality and poverty. Al-Marhubi (2000) finds positive association between corruption and inflation. Elliott (1997) discusses the multifarious effects of corruption in the global economy.
The above listing of recent theoretical and empirical research in corruption, while far from exhaustive, clearly indicate a lacuna in this area. While the theoretical papers almost without exception deal with the individual's incentives for corruption and possible government action to reduce such incentives at the individual level, the empirical papers deal with country level data on corruption level. The link between the micro and macro, in other words a macro model of corruption with micro-foundations, is missing. Without such a model, our understanding of the phenomenon of corruption remains incomplete and measures to combat it are unlikely to be successful.
General equilibrium models have, however, been developed in an area close to corruption -the area of crime and punishment. In a recent paper, Fender (1999) has developed a general equilibrium model of crime and punishment providing a few insights that, with some modifications, apply to the area of corruption. In this model a proportion of the population is assumed to be incapable of committing crime ('incorruptible') while the others choose between being a criminal or not (a binary choice) based on the trade-off between expected net gain from criminal activity and the opportunity cost of crime, i.e.
income from work. Potential earnings of agents are assumed to come from a uniform 6 distribution and constitute the only dimension of heterogeneity in the model. Using this relatively simple framework, the model derives multiple stable equilibria levels of national crime rates.
The general equilibrium model for corruption developed in this paper is in the same spirit but with a few important differences. Firstly, being corrupt is not assumed to be a binary choice but rather a choice of a level of corruption. No one is assumed to be incorruptible. Besides here we explicitly deal with the individual agent's decision-making problem involving the choice between risk-free return from honest work and risky returns from corruption. Agents are also assumed to be heterogeneous in terms of their attitude towards risk. The honest income potential is not exogenously imposed but is related to one's human capital level, which in turn is imperfectly correlated with parental income.
Finally one's potential for honest income is correlated with one's potential for corrupt income -a feature that provides the chief distinction between corruption and ordinary crime.
All these features give our model a much more realistic setting than in any previous work studying corruption. These gains in generality, however, come with the cost that the model ceases to be analytically tractable. Nevertheless the results of the model can be derived easily using simulations. In light of this we consider it worthwhile to sacrifice analytical elegance in favor of a more general setting and study the results of our model using the simulation approach. There is now a considerable and growing literature studying social phenomena using the 'bottom up' technique of artificial agent-based modeling with Epstein and Axtell (1996) being an early and well-known example 1 .
Consequently this approach is hardly novel in itself though this paper may be one of the first ones to apply it to the study of corruption. Agent based models are usually used to investigate learning or evolution of some kind. We use it here for a relatively simpler purpose -to explore the dynamics of a multi-generational model with heterogeneous agents and adaptive expectations.
Defining and Measuring Corruption
Corruption is a slippery concept (see the discussion in Bardhan (1997)) . At a broad level perhaps it may be defined as Transparency International defines it -"abuse of entrusted power for private profit". A more specific definition would be "the abuse of public office for private gain". Tanzi (1998) presents a detailed taxonomy of the different forms corruption may take. It is not our goal to come up with a universally acceptable, watertight definition of a corrupt activity. For our purposes, a corrupt activity must satisfy three criteria -it must have a positive expected economic value to its perpetrators, it must have some risk of socio-legal censure associated with it and it must adversely affect the economy. The first criterion is obvious since otherwise the perpetrators would have no incentive to be corrupt. The second one also is easy to defend. If an activity has no risk of legal reprisal at all, then irrespective of its ethicality, it must be the 'custom' in the society in question and cannot be called 'corruption' by the relevant social standards.
The third criterion is more arguable. If the laws of a country are themselves sub-optimal then it is conceivable that certain forms of corruption may at times actually improve the lot of the citizens. Lui (1985) argues that corruption need not always be welfare reducing.
However the empirical evidence of the effects of corruption convincingly tilts the scale against any such benefits. Mauro (1995) , Campos et al (1999) , Tanzi and Davoodi (1997) , Gupta et al (1998) , Al-Marhubi (2000) all document the ill effects of corruption 2 .
Even in theory, Kaufmann and Wei (2000) argue, the benefits of corruption that sometimes appear in partial equilibrium models disappear in general equilibrium settings.
Having thus characterized corruption, we have implicitly assumed that redistributing the gains of corruption cannot offset the harm caused. In other words, there is a dead-weight loss to society because of corruption. Schleifer and Vishny (1993) support this position. There are thus both income-reducing and income -redistributing effects of corruption.
Exactly how risky is the pay-off to corruption? The risk of corruption itself is a function of the level of corruption in society. It is hard to catch and convict a corrupt person in a corrupt society since the law enforcement agencies themselves are usually the breeding grounds of corruption. Social tolerance of corruption also grows after it reaches a certain threshold level. Gains from corruption are often viewed as the "unwritten perquisites" of government jobs in certain societies. This feature of corruption has been noted and modeled in several earlier papers. Mauro(1998) discusses different situations where the risks of corruption to the individual decline with rise in average level of corruption in society.
The above characterization of corruption, however, does not bring out the distinction between a corrupt activity and any other illegal activity like, say, petty theft.
The central distinction between a corrupt activity and petty theft is that the opportunities for corruption are not equally available to every member of the society but rather is highly correlated with the economic power enjoyed by an individual. This is not the case with other forms of illegal activity which are either equally possible for anyone to perpetrate or depend on factors not so closely related to economic power. A position of power, on the other hand, is a prerequisite for corruption. Not everyone can be equally corrupt. The fact that corruption tilts the balance against the poor in a country has more to do with the fact that the poor and deprived have no control over resources to be corrupt than with any virtues that poverty bestows. Thus the capability of corruption is a function of economic power and this feature is a crucial one in fully describing a corrupt activity.
The model we build in the following section takes into account this feature.
Finally, while the citizens of a society usually have a feel of the average level of corruption in that society, there is neither a unanimous way to measure it, nor a general agreement on the level. People, scholars and the laity alike, have to rely on their perception of corruption, which at times is determined more by media attention than anything more scientific. Even international organizations and consultants who rank countries according to their corruption level use subjective survey data to come up with their estimates. Thus the measures of corruption available are, at best, noisy. This feature is not unique to corruption but is associated with almost all forms of illegal activities (see Sah (1991) for a discussion of this feature in the context of crime).
These features of corruption make the task of defining a proper measure of corruption quite difficult. The level of corruption in a country is clearly a relative one, indicating how a country compares to others on that score. International organizations like the Transparency International also use this approach in their reports. One way to measure the level of corruption in a society is to have an index between 0 and 1 where 0 corresponds to a complete lack of corruption and 1 implies a debilitating level of corruption, i.e. the society produces nothing if corruption level is 1.
In a similar vein, an individual's level of corruption (which we shall refer to as the level of 'dishonesty' simply to distinguish from societal 'corruption' level) can also be measured by a 'dishonesty index' ranging between 0 and 1 where 0 indicates that the individual is completely honest and steals no part of the economic rents available to him or her and 1 means that the entire available rent is appropriated. It is important to note that this index is only the measure of the appropriated rents relative to the available rents.
Thus a president with a dishonesty index of 0.1 is likely to be appropriating much more economic rent in absolute terms than a clerk with a dishonesty index of 0.9.
words the corruption level is an average of the dishonesty levels of the individuals.
However since the dishonesty index is only a relative measure of rents appropriated, this average cannot be a simple one. An honest pauper cannot undo the sins of a corrupt president. The national corruption index, therefore, should be a weighted average of the dishonesty indices of the individuals with the weights being the economic power (or the size of available economic rents) enjoyed by the individuals.
The model described in the next section is built with these features in mind. It attempts to link individual choice of corruption levels to societal levels of corruption.
The Model

The Static Model
Assume an economy comprising n agents. Each individual i, i=1,…,n , has a certain endowment of human capital, k i , and an aversion towards risk summarized by the parameter, b i , in his utility function,
, where i ŷ is the expected income level and 2 y σ is the variance of i ŷ . An agent is active for only one period and thus the human capital has to be used in one go. 'Human capital' is defined in its broadest sense here to refer to the entire huma n contribution to the production process. In this sense it is similar to the quality-adjusted labor input of the neoclassical growth model.
At the aggregate level we think of the total output being the result of two basic inputs -social input, S and individual input K. We may think of K as simply the sum total of the individual human capital put to use and S as the institutional set-up -a public good that is essential for creation of value. S may be thought of as the way production and indeed society itself is organized and governed -subsuming within itself the entire legal and socio-political and economic framework that channels all individual efforts into an orchestrated productive enterprise. In other words, S, captures the network externalities of the social structure which makes the economy 'greater than the sum of its parts'. So we have the aggregate production function, Y = SK.
The parameter S itself is likely to depend on the level of K. As the average level of human capital, or 'knowledge and skills', rise in society, not only do individuals become more productive at the micro level, but through the design of more efficient social systems, raise the level of social input as well. Better-trained people are likely to design better social inputs. So if we assume a linear dependence here, then Y=αK 2 where
. This index may be thought of as the proportion of available rent that the individual appropriates through corrupt activity. Thus 0 denotes a completely honest person while 1 signifies a person who has stolen all that was possible from his position of economic power. The societal "corruption index", q is the obtained as
for this weighted average is discussed in the previous section.
In the presence of corruption, the efficacy of the social input is reduced as efforts of individuals result in lesser output. In other words, Y = {(1-q)S}K . This is the outputreducing effect of corruption. Therefore q may be interpreted as the proportional deadweight loss of output owing to corruption. Corruption also has distributive effects on output. Thus a proportion q of the total output is now distributed as the spoils of corruption while the remainder (1-q) part of the output goes to the agents as This characterization of corruption undoubtedly treats it just like another form of tax. This view, however, is hardly novel. Schleifer and Vishny (1993), for instance, underscore their similarity. They also point out that the "necessary secrecy" of corruption makes the distortions caused by it even more costly to the society. Clearly this secrecy is the result of the risk inherent in corrupt activity. . Now there is likely to be a positive relationship between the 3 This is done for simplicity. The two proportions do not need to be the same, but presumably both would be proportional to the level of corruption. 4 It might appear, at first glance, that a person can only have two possibilities -get away with corruption or get caught. However, we must remember that we are not talking about a single act by the agent but the human capital of an agent and how much he can expect to grab of the corruption pie. In other words, the higher up a person is in the economic hierarchy, the more he can get through corruption. The mean of the distribution of y c i is thus proportional to the human capital endowment of the agent. It also depends positively on the size of the pie (qY) and negatively on the human capital weighted cumulative efforts of other contenders ( ∑ ≠i j i k i p or, for a large enough population, approximately qK). The variance of the distribution, a measure of the risk of corruption, is positively related to the level of "effective social capital", (1-q)S , and the proportion of national income devoted to anticorruption vigilance (γ). Also the risk is assumed to increase with the human capital of the individual (k i ), simply because of greater visibility and impact. The intuition here is that a fully corrupt politician is more prone to come under scrutiny than an equally unscrupulous municipal clerk. Anti-corruption programs are also more likely to go for the "big fishes" in order to maximize the resulting 'catch' in money terms for a given investment in such programs. Thus a fully corrupt agent's income from corruption may be modeled as
Notice that other things remaining the same, both the risk and return of corrupt activity increase with the quality of the institutional set-up, an assumption that matches our intuition when comparing developed nations with developing countries.
level of honesty he practices throughout his career. Normal distribution then becomes the obvious choice for characterizing his returns from his whole career or a part of it.
An individual however, does not have to be fully corrupt. As noted before, he can choose his level of corruption or dishonesty level anywhere between 0 and 1. In choosing this dishonesty level, p i , the agent is, in effect, making a classical portfolio decision. The entitlement to his income flow from honest activity, {(1-q)S}k i , is a risk-less asset while the income from his corrupt activity, y c , is risky . How much he will partake in this risky asset depends not only on the distribution of y c i but also on his level of risk-aversion, b i .
In other words, the agent chooses his level of dishonesty index, p i , so as to maximize his utility function u i introduced before. Thus we can write down his problem
If we assume that individual agents ignore the impact they have on the societal corruption level then this problem has a simple solution:
Thus the individual's dishonesty level is decreasing in his risk-aversion, the proportional expenditure on vigilance, γ, his own human capital level, the quality of social institutions, and increasing in the societal level of corruption. Thus with a very simple model of risk-averse agents, we have been able to produce the inverse relation between the level of development as reflected in human capital endowment (since S is an increasing linear function o f K) and corruption -a well known stylized fact (see Treisman (2000) ).
We must note here that the fact that the spoils from corruption are stochastic to the individual agent makes the total claim on output also stochastic albeit with a much lower variance. There is no guarantee then that the total claims will match up with the output produced. This problem, however, is not central to the discussion here and may be assumed away with the assumption of an external insurer who absorbs the aggregate shock. This assumption is quite realistic in today's world of international capital mobility.
The agents, therefore, make their choice of dishonesty levels based on, inter alia, the societal corruption level. The societal corruption level, in turn, is the result of these choices. Clearly this is a fixed-point problem and it may not be difficult to prove the existence of a rational expectation equilibrium in this set-up. However, it may be closer to reality to assume that what goes on is adaptive expectation where agents make their choices on their perception of pre-existing societal corruption. Besides the relative levels of human capital itself needs to be made endogenous. This brings us to the multi-period version of the model.
The Multi-period Model: The Evolution of Corruption
Let us assume an overlapping generation model for the economy with two generations alive at any one point in time, each generation living for two periods. The population is constant and every agent has one offspring. During the first half of his life an agent accumulates human capital through a process that we shall soon describe and learns about the state of the society by observing the seniors. That is where he makes an assessment of the societal corruption level which he assumes will stay the same when he is productive in the second half of his life. In the latter half he is active and chooses his dishonesty level based on this assessment. Adaptive expectation is a better way to go in this situation because of two reasons. Firstly, the exact level of corruption depends on the joint distribution of k and b. It is too complex to exactly solve for q without assuming a correlation structure. Secondly, as noted in the previous sections, people in reality have at best an "idea" of the social level of corruption and that idea is likely to be influenced more by the perceptions of society early in life, before entering the productive period.
Besides the bounded rationality of adaptive expectations has been shown to attain "near optimal" utility levels in several situations (see Akerlof and Yellen (1985) , Jones and Stock (1987) and Naish (1993) ).
Given our use of agent based modeling and simulations to investigate the results of our model, it is relatively easy to introduce other, more complicated, 'learning' rules rather than simple adaptive expectations. Indeed, applications of agent based modeling usually deal with learning heuristics and evolution, features that the technique is best suited for dealing with. In the present context, however, such rules would contribute more to the complicacy of the model than to the richness or generality of its results. Therefore we assume simple adaptive expectations to be the learning heuristic in this case.
The story remains incomplete without describing how agents acquire human capital. Since both honest and corrupt incomes are increasing in an agent's level of human capital, it is reasonable to assume that the agents would like to acquire as much human capital as possible. We also assume that the agents take care of their children to the best of their abilities and thus there is a correlation between a parent's realized income and her offspring's level of human capital. However, in the presence of public schooling as well as due to individual differences, this correlation is not perfect. We may then think of the human capital endowment of an agent consisting of a mixture of two distributions. Both distributions are between exogenously determined bounds. In the first distribution, the relative position of an agent in the distribution of human capital is the same as that of his parent's realized income ( y i ') in the income distribution of the previous generation. The second distribution is simply a uniform distribution between the bounds. The proportion of the second distribution in the mixture (τ) is a measure of the effectiveness of public schooling or political institutions to break the monopoly of power.
Thus the human capital level is given by:
where Z ~ U(k min , k max ) .
With these assumptions, a fully dynamic model of the society becomes complete.
Note that risk aversion is randomly distributed among agents of every generation. We now proceed to study the nature of equilibria in this model -their existence and stability.
For this purpose, the tool of computer simulation of an artificial society built according to this model will be used in the next section. For easy reference, a glossary of the terms and symbols used in the model as well as in the simulations is provided in table I.
The Simulations
The Method and the Parameters
Given the difficulty in obtaining a closed-form solution and proofs of the dynamic paths of corruption in the model described above, we create an artificial society and simulate the evolution of corruption in the society over several generations What exactly are we observing? Our observation consists of six variables, q eqm , y eqm , q conv , y conv , prob q and prob y , all of which measure the level and extent of convergence in the time path of societal corruption (q) and national income (y). Before explaining these variables, however, it is worthwhile to note that the technique of studying convergence of dynamic processes using simulations has its own limitations.
There is no way to detect an unstable equilibrium except through sheer luck (i.e. if the starting value matches that equilibrium). Total convergence is not achieved in finite time and hence one has to be content with a lack of trend and dispersion below a certain preset criterion to detect convergence. One way to do it may be to see how many generations or periods it takes to enter the satisfactory range. The other method may be to fix the number of periods beforehand and study the variation in the last few periods. We employ this second approach here. In either case the results lack the finality and elegance of closed-form solutions.
In face of these limitations one should remember that the simulation approach is employed only when getting a closed form solution is either impossible or would involve making cripplingly simplifying assumptions. Also maybe the loss is really not that serious. Firstly, an unstable equilibrium is hardly anything more than a mathematical curiosity 7
. It does not do much damage to a policy maker not to know of its existence at all. Insisting on perfect convergence or knowing the exact figure for the equilibrium value too attaches more importance to the model than it deserves. One must keep in mind that any model is only an imperfect simplified version of reality and it is the qualitative results that are of prime importance, not the equilibrium values.
In our simulations, we look at the 'long run averages' of the corruption level q and national income y to ascertain the equilibrium levels. Thus q eqm and y eqm refer to the average of q and y respectively over the last 50 generations. To check if equilibrium or convergence has really been achieved, we employ two indicators -the coefficient of variation of values in the last 50 generations and the probability or p-value of the hypothesis of zero slope of the regression line through the last 50 values (prob i where i = q or y). The results of these simulations are discussed below.
The Possibility of Hyper-corruption
Hyper-corruption, a state of affairs where the societal corruption level is 1 and no economic value is created by the society, is an disturbing scenario. In real life while we do not see this limiting case, societies like Zaire or Kenya have at times come close to completely dysfunctional economies owing to crippling levels of corruption. Near this state of hyper-corruption, social institutions themselves change and new power structures emerge. These changes may be the political disintegration of a nation to smaller units or a revolution that changes the norms of doing business in the country. It may even lead to more fundamental religious or social upheavals that bring a society back to 'reasonable' levels of corruption.
Clearly our model here is not broad enough to incorporate these very long-run changes in socio-economic organization. For our purposes, we shall allow the phenomenon of hyper-corruption to be a legitimate possibility for our artificial society and look at parameter combinations, if any, that might lead to such unfortunate socioeconomic outcomes.
As it turns out, given the parameter space that we have chosen, there are certain Thus the behavior of corruption does seem to depict a valley in a segment of our parameter space where the topography seems to be more or less smooth (as will be revealed by later results) surrounded by sudden steep hills. Most real-life societies seem to be residing in the valley, properties of which we shall be exploring in the following paragraphs. This also provides a rationale for our choice of the segment of the parameter space for exploration. The state of hyper-corruption is the social counterpart of a 'black hole' with its deadly circumference of attraction extending in all dimensions. Once countries stray into its sphere of influence, little can be done in terms of policy. Most of the following discussion applies only to the more tranquil regions of the parameter space, a part of which we explore in our simulations.
Simulation Results: the Time Path of Corruption and Income
As we saw before, we have 729 distinct parameter combinations in our simulations. The overall average 'long-run' (last 50 generations average) value is 0.078.
We must bear in mind though that this is not an exercise in calibration and the value itself is of secondary importance. What is of fundamental interest is the pattern of the time paths, whether they actually converge to some number or not. However, the range of On the whole it does appear that the process stabilizes in 100 generations in most of the cases. The coefficient of variation in the last 50 generations has an average of about 0.03
for both q and y. The maximum is 0.14 for q and 0.11 for y. Once again reasonable convergence seems to be reached in 100 generations. The overall average, standard deviation, maximum and minimum of the different variables are presented in table III.
Time paths of corruption and income for a particular parameter combination are shown in figure I for illustrative purposes.
The Comparative Statics: Effects of Socio-Economic Parameters
The It is hardly surprising that a higher level of average risk aversion leads to lower corruption. Clearly more risk-averse people must be honest according to the model used here. The negative impact of k is also in line with our expectations since the individual choice of dishonesty level was inversely affected by k (through S) in eqn.
(1') in the previous section. Similarly the fact that higher γ reduces corruption is also expected. As a higher γ causes the fruits of corruption to be more risky, it can only reduce corruption.
The interesting results in this section are really those that were not expected before running the simulations. For instance, one would have been hard pressed to figure out the effect of b range or τ on the equilibrium values of corruption and income a priori.
The simulations reveal that a wider dispersion in risk aversion raises corruption and cuts income in the long-run. τ, on the other hand, leaves the equilibrium corruption level unaffected but r aises income in the long-run and helps immensely in attaining convergence in both corruption and income.
Regarding better vigilance, it is only expected that as γ goes up q goes down. The key question there is: are the economic returns to higher vigilance commensurate with its costs? A first cut at answering that question may be had from looking at the average values in the first panel of table IV. Raising γ by 2 percentage points first raises equilibrium income by a full 4%. The second such raise leads to a 2.1% increase. What this seems to suggest is that raising vigilance does pay in terms of higher equilibrium income but has diminishing marginal returns. Of course this is over and above what other socio-economic benefits may accrue from the reduction in corruption level. It may well lead to more egalitarian distribution of income and fair returns to human capital that are not captured by the equilibrium income.
An interesting result is that the initial level of corruption does not have much impact on the long-run levels of corruption or income. The model here seems to suggest that the long-run levels of corruption in societies are the results of their socio-economic "fundamentals" and not the initial values. In other words, the equilibria are stable over the section of the parameter space explored. We should, however, remember that in certain corners of the parameter space a high initial value does lead to hyper-corruption and the stability of the equilibria discussed here is, therefore, local.
Conclusions And Future Research
Building a multi-generational agent based model with heterogeneous risk-averse agents and using simulations, this paper shows that societies have locally stable equilibrium levels of corruption that depend upon a small number of socio-economic parameters. However under certain combinations of these parameter values it is possible for corruption to go on an ever-increasing trajectory till it stifles all economic activity.
The equilibrium levels of corruption depend primarily on the degree of risk aversion, the proportion of national income spent on anti-corruption vigilance and the level of human capital in the society.
This paper provides a structure to the phenomenon of corruption and its causes. It helps us better understand the myriad empirical findings in the recent literature in the area by delineating the channels through which various socio-economic factors influence the level of corruption in a society. Consider, for instance, the results of Treisman (2000) . He finds that countries with Protestant traditions, history of British rule, higher level of development and higher level of imports, longer history of democracy and unitary (as opposed to federal) structures have lower levels of corruption. These results, though interesting and important, need a structure for a better understanding of the causes of corruption. The present paper may help in outlining the channels through which they affect corruption.
Religious traditions and other cultural factors may affect the risk taking behavior of agents in a society and the dispersion therein (this is not to understate the contribution of religion to morality, which, ceteris paribus, would also reduce corruption). History of a particular form of legal system may well be affecting the ratio of social capital S to total human capital K -α in our parlance -thus reducing corruption levels for some societies as compared to others that are similar in other dimensions. The fact that a higher level of development implying a higher level of human capital endowment reduces corruption is clear from our equation (1') too. Higher imports, implying more openness in the economy, may be contributing to lowering corruption by fostering higher growth and development (see Harrison (1996) and Levine and Renelt (1992) ) and thus raising human capital levels. Democratic institutions may be working through more egalitarian access to human capital (τ) and structure of the state -federal versus unitary -may be affecting the overall anti-corruption expenditures (γ) or affecting the industrial organization (α Erstwhile colonies or countries where a foreign system of governance is imposed or adopted on a pre-existing traditional society seem to have greater corruption. How can the model here be extended to explain these situations?
Why do societies in a mode of transition appear to have more corruption than others -be it a transition from a pastoral/feudal structure to an industrial structure or that from a socialist system to a market-oriented one? Is it possible that at a transition, the society's old familiar ways of organizing production gives way to a new industrial organization opening up a window of low social capital, S, that unleashes a wave of corruption? If so, then is it possible that if the other parameters are not kept in reins then this corruption can actually completely derail the transition and development process?
Our experiences in Africa and in the former Soviet Union do seem to confirm these fears.
What are the real life values of the parameters discussed here? Is it possible to calibrate a society and predict future levels of corruption? How can governments actually affect the socio-economic factors behind corruption? What role does the media have in the combat against corruption? Several of the above questions can be addressed using the methodology of agent based modeling applied here. The investigation of these and other questions provide a promising research agenda in an area which, given its role in Table 1 Glossary of Terms q conv The coefficient of variation in q in the last 50 generations y conv The coefficient of variation in y in the last 50 generations prob q Probability that the slope of the trend line through the last 50 observations of q is zero. prob y Probability that the slope of the trend line through the last 50 observations of y is zero. Table 2 Panel A
Parameters Varied
Average level of risk aversion, b 3 3.5 4
Range of risk-aversion, b range 1 1.5 2
Proportion of income spent on vigilance, γ 0.1 0.12 0.14 Mean human capital endowment in the first generation, k 0.5 0.6 0.7
Equality in access to human capital, τ 0.1 0.5 0.9
Initial value of social corruption, q start 0.1 0.3 0.5
Panel B
Parameters Held Constant
Population 1000
Number of generations simulated 100
Number of replications 30
Range of human capital endowment 1
The ratio of social capital to total human capital, α ½ 
